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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Charitable organizations employ a variety of methods for
† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. University of
Minnesota, English Literature, Computer Science.
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (7th ed. 1999) (defining charitable
organization as “[a] tax-exempt organization that (1) is created and operated
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raising funds and educating the public about their causes and
2
activities. The act of asking individuals for money is common to
3
most charities. While there is nothing inherently fraudulent about
charitable solicitation, the potential for fraud and abuse has led
4
most states to enact legislation regulating fundraising. The ability
exclusively for religious, scientific, literary, educational, athletic, public-safety, or
community service purposes.”). The Internal Revenue Service definition expands
the classifications of purpose, but includes the prohibitions against any part of the
net earnings inuring “to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” or
involvement in political campaigns “on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2004). The definition
commonly seen in case law defines a charity as a gift benefiting the public “by
bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to
establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.” Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867); see also Junior Achievement of Greater
Minneapolis, Inc. v. State, 271 Minn. 385, 390, 135 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1965). See
also BLACK’S, supra, at 343 (defining nonprofit corporation as one “organized for
some purpose other than making a profit, and usually afforded special tax
treatment”).
2. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUNDRAISING ch. 7 (3d ed. 2002
& supp. 2004) (describing state and federal regulations of charitable solicitation,
charitable sales promotion, and charity auctions); ASSOCIATION OF FUNDRAISING
at
PROFESSIONALS, THE AFP FUNDRAISING DICTIONARY ONLINE (2003),
http://www.afpnet.org/content_documents/AFP_Dictionary_A-Z_final_6-9-03.pdf
(defining a wide variety of terms used in the course of soliciting charitable funds).
3. Charitable giving is a complex behavior that involves the financial
resources of the individual, the need of the organization, and the cause or
program being supported. Tax incentives such as deductibility of contributions
may influence the amount given. Donations to organizations granted tax-exempt
status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) are deductible to taxpayers who itemize, with some
limitations. See I.R.C. § 170 (West 2004) (granting a deduction for “charitable
contributions,” which are defined as “a contribution or gift to or for the use of . .
.[a corporation] organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes . . .”).
4. Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia require some form of
charitable solicitation registration. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-9-70-76 (2003); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.68.010-.900 (Michie 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-6551 to -6561 (2004); ARK.
CODE. ANN. §§ 4-28-401 to -416 (Michie 2003); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12580-99.5
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-16-101 to -113 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
21A-175 to -194 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-1701 to -1714 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch.
496.401-424 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-1, 43-17-23 (2004); 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 460/1-23 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 17-1759 to -1776 (2003); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 367.650-670 (Michie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1901-1901.1 (West
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 5001-16 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., BUS.
REG. §§ 6-101 to -102 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 68, §§ 18-35 (2004); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 400.271-294 (2004); MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-61 (2003); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-11-501 to -529 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.450-89 (2004); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19-32-b (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:17A-18 to -40 (2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to -11 (Michie 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 171-a to 177
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to regulate charitable solicitation is not without limits, however.
During the 1980s, state and local officials attempted to enact
legislation that sought to protect the public from fraud and
required open, accountable, and effective charitable organizations.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court decided that some of
these regulations impinged on the First Amendment rights of the
5
charity to educate the public about its cause.
Because the Court held that charitable solicitation had an
educational and advocacy component, the regulation of which was
6
subject to strict scrutiny, it was unclear whether a fraud cause of
action could proceed against a professional fundraiser acting on
7
behalf of a charity. By its unanimous decision in Illinois ex rel.
(Consol. 2004); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 131F-1 to -4 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-2201 to -07 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1716.01-99 (Anderson 2004); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 18, §§ 552.1-18 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.801-898 (2003); 10 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 162.1-24 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 5-53.1-1 to -18 (2003); S.C.
CODE. ANN. §§ 33-56-10 to 56-200 (Law Co-op. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101501 to -521 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-22-1 to -23 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5748 to -69 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.09.010-915 (2004); W. VA. CODE §§
29-19-1 to -15b (2004); WIS. STAT. §§ 440.41-48 (2003). Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and
Wyoming require no registration. See The Unified Registration Statement at
http://www.multistatefiling.org (July 30, 2003). See also A MODEL ACT CONCERNING
THE SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES (Nat’l Assoc. of State Charity
Officials, et al. 1986), at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&sdpid=21
&curdoc=240 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). States that do not require the charity to
register may still require the professional fundraiser to register or the charity to
file copies of contracts with professional fundraisers. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§
467B-6, B-12 (2003).
5. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (refusing to “separate the component parts
of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole.”).
7. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 289, 299
(Ill. 2001) (concluding that there is no “nexus between high solicitation costs and
fraud and attempts to regulate defendant’s constitutionally protected solicitations
on that basis”); People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 729 N.E.2d 965,
971 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (upholding the grant of dismissal to the defendant and
finding “the type of allegations made by the Attorney General’s complaint violate
the First Amendment and have been thoroughly discredited by the Supreme
Court”). The depth of this uncertainty is apparent in the question certified for
certiorari to the Supreme Court, which read, “Whether the First Amendment
categorically prohibits a State from pursuing a fraud action against a professional
fundraiser who represents that donations will be used for charitable purposes but
in fact keeps the vast majority (in this case 85 percent) of all funds donated.” (Pet.
for Cert. I). Lisa Madigan replaced Jack Ryan as Illinois Attorney General after the
completion of the state-level litigation, but before the U.S. Supreme Court heard
the appeal. See Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan Takes Oath
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Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., the Court determined that
the First Amendment did not protect fraudulent charitable
8
solicitations.
This holding reflects the culmination of previous cases
adjudicating the First Amendment rights of fundraisers. The
decision also guides state and local regulators to a means of
achieving their public policy goals of protecting the public from
fraudulent charitable solicitations. The decision is meant to
balance the protection of the public from fraudulent solicitations
with a charity’s right to speak, educate, and solicit funds.
The regulatory landscape has changed in the ten years leading
up to the Telemarketing Associates decision. Disclosures by charities
of their overall finances as well as their contractual relationships
with professional fundraisers are the norm. Public disclosures of
that information, particularly on the Internet, provide donors and
regulators with a generous amount of information on which to base
decisions. As a result, regulators and the public have more
information with which to combat fraud.
There is irony in the fact that the best means of preventing
fraud may be a fraud cause of action itself. By focusing on fraud,
the Court has highlighted an area of speech that does not deserve
the same level of protection as charitable solicitation. Fraud
prosecution, then, can be wielded as a tool to combat unscrupulous
fundraisers. Fraud litigation against charities and paid professional
fundraisers in the wake of the Telemarketing Associates decision
indicate that the most egregious offenders can be stopped through
coordinated anti-fraud campaigns.
This Note first examines the history of the relevant law in the
9
areas of fraud, charitable solicitation, and prior restraints.
Specifically, it examines the three leading cases on regulation of
10
charitable fundraising speech: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.
Next, the Note discusses the history and holding of Illinois ex rel.
11
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
Next, this Note will
of Office as First Female Illinois Attorney General (Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with
author).
8. 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring). “What the First Amendment
and our case law emphatically do not require, however, is a blanket exemption
from fraud liability for a fundraiser who intentionally misleads in calls for
donations.” Id. at 621.
9. See infra Part II.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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explore the holding in Telemarketing Associates in light of Schaumburg
12
This analysis includes a survey of recent and
and its progeny.
pending fraud litigation against charities and their fundraisers, and
a review of the Federal Trade Commission’s “Operation Phoney
13
Philanthropy.” Finally, the Note concludes with some regulatory
considerations for charities, fundraisers, and regulators as they
proceed in the post-Telemarketing Associates era.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A. The Charitable Solicitation Regulatory Environment Before
Schaumburg
Fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or
14
Specifically, fraud in the charitable context
her detriment.”
involves soliciting funds in the name of a charity with the intention
that little, if any, of the funds raised would go to the charity for
15
program activities as the donor intended. The Supreme Court
has regularly found fraudulent speech to be of low value, and
16
therefore unprotected. Charitable fraud is no different in this
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Id. This play on words was lost on the Connecticut Attorney General’s
Office. See infra note 140.
14. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 670. The elements of the intentional tort of
fraud (or deceit) are generally 1) false representation with 2) knowledge that the
representation is false 3) that the plaintiff relies on 4) to his or her detriment. W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS ch. 18 § 105 (5th ed. 1984).
See also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 1 (2003) (discussing the broad nature of
fraud as the “multifarious means that human ingenuity can devise and that are
resorted to by one individual to gain advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth”).
15. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 665,
677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (listing concealment of costs, sham corporate entities,
unauthorized charges, and donor list making for personal gain as fraudulent
activities). See also People v. Stone, 197 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959)
(failing to inform the contributing public of 45 percent professional fundraising
fee is fraud); People v. Nat’l Cancer Hosp. of Am., 102 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1951) (calling an eighteen percent return to the charity from a
fundraising appeal a false representation when not accompanied by a disclosure of
the deductions).
16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). “[T]here is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate on public issues.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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17

regard.
Charitable solicitation is principally regulated by the states
18
through their representative attorneys general as an exercise of
19
20
21
In some cases, counties and cities have
the police power.
instituted charitable regulations. Typically, charity regulators
attempt to protect the public from fraud by imposing disclosure
22
requirements. Many of the attempts by states and municipalities
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (noting that a state may
use its penal laws to protect its citizens by punishing fraudulent solicitations
committed “under the cloak of religion”); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939) (denouncing fraud, including appeals “made in the name of charity and
religion” as offenses punishable by law). But see United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d
653, 657 (2d Cir. 1952) (labeling intent as a “practically crucial” element of fraud
despite less than seven percent of $120,000 raised being used for charitable
purposes).
18. See John W. Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney
General, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 246-50 (2004) (describing the early English and
American common law authority of charitable regulation). In most states this has
been written into statute. See statutes cited supra note 4. In addition to regulation
of charitable solicitations, most charity regulators have broad powers to enforce
the fiduciary duties of directors and officers. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 317A.467
(2003) (describing the attorney general’s power to seek broad equitable relief for
any violation of chapter 317A).
19. Nat’l Found. v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1969)
(citations omitted). “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. “It is a traditional exercise
of the States' ‘police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.’”
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 475 (1996)). See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (stating that a state can
regulate the time, place, and manner of charitable solicitation as a means to
“safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v.
Pinellas County, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (challenging a Pinellas
County, Florida registration ordinance on due process grounds); Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness of W. Pa. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
[hereinafter Krishna Consciousness].
21. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (describing a city
ordinance that prohibited ringing doorbells or knocking on doors of residences);
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (reviewing a municipal ordinance
that required validation of the cause by the police before solicitation could occur);
Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 43 nn.1-2.
22. Charities interested in soliciting funds may be required to register and
provide information, including the names and salaries of directors, purposes and
methods of solicitation, and copies of contracts between the charity and
professional fundraisers. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 309.52 (2003). Charities may also
be required to provide detailed financial information on an annual basis. See, e.g.,
id. § 309.53. Professional fundraisers may be required to post a bond and state
affirmatively the percentage of funds raised received by the charity. See, e.g., id. §
309.531.
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to regulate or restrict the ability of charitable and religious groups
to solicit, advocate, or canvass have conflicted with the First
23
Amendment.
Because the charitable solicitation was the most
likely source of fraud within the charity’s operations, a common
regulatory technique involved limiting the percentage cost of
24
fundraising relative to the amount raised.
Unfortunately, state and federal courts were unable to reach
consensus about whether such limits were appropriate exercises of
25
the police power of the states and their political subdivisions or
prior restraints on speech that violated the First Amendment rights
26
In three separate decisions
of charities and religious groups.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Hynes, 425 U.S. at 621-23 (holding as vague an
ordinance that required police notice before canvassing); Martin, 319 U.S. at 15354 (voiding an ordinance that prohibited door knocking or doorbell ringing in
order to deliver handbills to residents); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 413-14
(1943) (overturning an ordinance prohibiting “distribution” of handbills);
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 (prohibiting a state determination of what constitutes a
religious cause before granting a license for the “perpetuation of religious views or
systems”); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163-64 (nullifying a canvassing ordinance that
targeted non-commercial speech such as religious, political, or social
information); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (characterizing
as overly broad an ordinance that required city manager permission before
literature distribution).
24. See, e.g., Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 43 n.2 (authorizing the city secretary to
deny fundraising permits to organizations when the cost of fundraising exceeds 20
percent of funds raised); Krishna Consciousness, 437 F. Supp. at 667 (imposing a
rebuttable presumption of fraud on fundraising costs exceeding twenty-five
percent of charitable solicitations conducted at county airports); Hillman v.
Britton, 168 Cal. Rptr. 852, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (describing a Fresno
ordinance that held fundraising costs over 15 percent to be unreasonable). See
also Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Validity and Application of Governmental Limitation
on Permissible Amount or Proportion of Fundraising Expenses or Administrative Costs of
Charitable Organizations, 15 A.L.R.4th 1163 (1995).
25. Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 46 (providing an opportunity for the charity to
show the reasonableness of its high fundraising costs was flexible and acceptable);
Krishna Consciousness, 437 F. Supp. at 671 (finding the fundraising costs provision
constitutionally sound, but requiring a speedy appeals process for permit denials);
People ex rel. Scott, 376 N.E.2d at 674 (upholding a state statute requiring seventyfive percent of gross receipts collected be used for charitable purposes).
26. Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (concluding
that an airport restriction on solicitation was a prior restraint without proper
safeguards); Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 90-94 (D. Kan. 1978) (granting
of a license to solicit based on a determination of what is a religious cause is
unconstitutional); Hillman, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 858-61 (discussing prior restraints in
the area of charitable solicitation without deciding on their exact contours). Prior
restraints interfere with the content of speech before it is delivered or published.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931). In the charitiable solicitation
context, there is concern for licenses that may be denied arbitrarily without due
process. See Fernandes, 465 F. Supp. at 501-02 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380
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dating from the 1980s, the Court struck down legislation and
ordinances that sought to prevent fraud by regulating charitable
solicitation based on percentage of donations used for fundraising
27
costs. In each case, the means of protecting legitimate state or
municipal interests such as preventing fraudulent solicitation of its
citizens were insufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand strict
28
scrutiny.
These cases built upon each other in two significant ways.
First, as each rule or statute was struck down, attempts were made
to bring existing laws in line with the Supreme Court decisions
without sacrificing the desire for broad protections against
fraudulent solicitation. Second, the holdings in each case broaden
the First Amendment protection of charitable solicitation, while
making attempts at regulation based on fundraising expenses more
difficult, if not impossible. It was within the existing contours of
these decisions that the Supreme Court decided Telemarketing
29
Associates.
B. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
The first of the three major cases to present the issue of prior
restraints on charitable solicitation was Village of Schaumburg v.
30
In that case, the Village of
Citizens for a Better Environment.
Schaumburg (“Schaumburg”) adopted a measure that required
charities obtain a permit prior to soliciting funds either door-to31
door or in the public streets.
Furthermore, the ordinance
required that permit applications include “[s]atisfactory proof that
at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will
32
be used directly for the charitable purposes of the organization.”
U.S. 51 (1965)) (discussing procedural safeguards for speech regulation); Hillman
168 Cal. Rptr. at 858-61 (same).
27. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
28. See cases cited supra note 27.
29. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600,
612-18 (2003) (describing the history of the trilogy of cases and the prophylactic
measures designed to prevent fraud in charitable solicitation).
30. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
31. Id. at 623.
32. Id. at 624 (quoting SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 22-20(g) (1974)).
Organizations were required to submit a certified audit or similar documentation
detailing the distribution of funds raised. Id. at 624 n.4 (quoting SCHAUMBURG,
ILL., CODE § 22-20). The ordinance required charities to exclude from the
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The Court analyzed the Schaumburg ordinance with respect to
33
some basic principles set down by previous decisions. The Court
reiterated the fundamental protection the First Amendment
34
provides to charitable solicitations. The Court characterized the
speech aspects of charitable solicitation as:
Involv[ing] a variety of speech interests—communication
of information, the dissemination and propagation of
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes . . . .
[S]olicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking
support for particular causes or for particular views on
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality
that without solicitation the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease . . . . Furthermore, because
charitable solicitation does more than inform private
economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with
providing information about the characteristics and costs
of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our
35
cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.
Reasonable regulation of such speech is allowable only to the
extent that it is sufficiently specific and narrowly tailored to avoid
36
acting as a prior restraint on such speech.
The Court examined Schaumburg’s interest to determine if it
was sufficiently strong to justify the restriction of protected speech
charitable purpose “[s]alaries or commissions paid to solicitors [and]
[a]dministrative expenses of the organization.” Id. (quoting SCHAUMBURG, ILL.,
CODE § 22-20(g)).
33. Id. at 628-33. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976)
(recognizing the power of a municipality to enforce reasonable regulations when
appropriately narrow and specific); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (barring
an absolute prohibition against the distribution of handbills involving a religious
purpose because of the solicitation of funds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (holding a statute requiring a license to solicit funds for religious,
charitable, or philanthropic purposes as an invalid prior restraint on the free
exercise of a religion); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(acknowledging the potential for fraud in charitable or religious solicitations, but
holding nonetheless that licensing requirements constitute an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of speech).
34. Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
35. Id. This characterization was by no means unanimous. Id. at 644
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). “While such activity may be worthy of heightened
protection when limited to the dissemination of information . . . a simple request
for money lies far from the core protections of the First Amendment as heretofore
interpreted.” Id. (citations omitted). The dissent analogized future governmental
attempts to regulate charitable solicitation as task worthy of Sisyphus. Id. at 639.
36. Id. at 637.
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prompted by the seventy-five percent fundraising requirement.
The Court considered that Schaumburg had a legitimate interest in
preventing fraud, but held that there was an insufficient
relationship between the fundraising prohibition and the seventy38
five percent threshold. High fundraising costs can result from “a
wide range of variables, many of which are beyond the control of
39
the organization.”
Instead, the Court encouraged efforts that
sought to punish fraudulent misrepresentations directly or by
promoting disclosures that inform the public about the charity’s
40
finances.
C.

Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.

The Court next took up the issue of restrictions on charitable
41
solicitation in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
The statute at issue was similar to the Schaumburg ordinance in
42
that it sought to limit fundraising expenses to twenty-five percent.
However, the statute differed significantly because it offered
charities a means to avoid the twenty-five percent ceiling if the limit
43
would prevent the organization from fundraising. The parties in
37. Id. at 636.
38. Id. at 637. “[C]haritable solicitation is not so inherently conductive to
fraud and overreaching as to justify its prohibition.” Id. at 638 n.11.
39. Id. at 637 n.10.
40. Id. at 637-38. “Illinois law, for example, requires charitable organizations
to register with the State Attorney General’s Office and to report certain
information about their structure and fundraising activities.” Id. at 638 n.12
(citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 23 § 5102(a) (1977)).
41. 467 U.S. 947 (1984) [hereinafter Munson]. Other cases decided in the
interim interpreted the Court’s holding in Village of Schaumburg differently. See
Nat’l Black United Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 494 F. Supp. 748, 759 (D.C. 1980)
(finding a twenty-five percent administrative and fundraising expense cap to be
reasonable on its face, but “applied in a manner which sweeps quite broadly,
precluding participation by organizations well within the proper purpose of the
[fundraising campaign].”); Holloway v. Brown, 403 N.E.2d 191, 196 (Ohio 1980)
(distinguishing the instant ordinance from that at issue in Village of Schaumburg
because of a higher percentage limit on costs and a rebuttable presumption of
unreasonableness).
42. Munson, 467 U.S. at 951. “A charitable organization . . . may not pay or
agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a total
amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by
reason of the fund-raising activity.” Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. § 103D(a)
(1982)).
43. Id. “The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a
charitable organization to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with its
fund-raising activity . . . in those instances where the 25% limitation would
effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.” Id. n.2
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Munson also differed from those in Schaumburg. The Joseph H.
Munson Co. (“Munson”) was not a charitable organization, but a
professional fundraising business that solicited funds on behalf of
Maryland nonprofit organizations, specifically the Fraternal Order
45
of Police.
In Munson the Court found the availability of a discretionary
waiver from the Secretary of State was not sufficient to meet the
46
First Amendment challenge. The Court did not find the statute a
suitable means for achieving the goal of preventing fraudulent
47
charitable solicitation. The Court described the poor fit between
the goal of the statute and the potential misapplication as:
operat[ing] on a fundamentally mistaken premise that
high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud.
That the statute in some of its applications actually
prevents the misdirection of funds from the organization’s
purported charitable goal is little more than fortuitous. It
is equally likely that the statute will restrict First
Amendment activity that results in high costs but is itself a
part of the charity’s goal or that is simply attributable to
the fact that the charity’s cause proves to be unpopular.
On the other hand, if an organization indulges in fraud,
there is nothing in the percentage limitation that prevents
it from misdirecting funds. In either event, the percentage
limitation, though restricting solicitation costs, will have
48
done nothing to prevent fraud.
The waiver notwithstanding, the Maryland statute, like the
Schaumburg ordinance, was insufficiently narrowly tailored to
49
avoid a First Amendment challenge.
The dissent in Munson, however, saw a more substantial link
50
between high fundraising costs and fraud. Calling the statute a
form of economic regulation, the dissent found only an indirect
(quoting MD. CODE ANN. § 103D(a) (1982)).
44. See id. at 950; Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620.
45. Munson, 467 U.S. at 950. Because Munson was a for-profit, professional
fundraising organization not directly targeted by the statute, the Court had to
address the issue of Munson’s standing to sue. Id. at 954-60. The Court held that
Munson satisfied the “case or controversy” requirement and satisfactorily framed
the issues for an over breadth challenge to the statute. Id. at 958-60. See also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
46. Munson, 467 U.S. at 962-69.
47. Id. at 966-67.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 970.
50. Id. at 980 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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51

impact on protected expression. The regulation would impose a
price control on the market that may drive marginal producers out
of the charitable solicitation business, but protected expression
52
would not be fundamentally harmed.
Moreover, the dissent argued that the statute should withstand
even heightened scrutiny because strong government interests are
53
present. Such a statute coincides with the public’s expectation of
how the charity uses donated charitable dollars, thereby bolstering
54
confidence. In those cases where a donor is unaware that only a
small portion of the funds raised actually goes to the charity, the
55
dissent would find “an element of fraud.” Regardless of whether
or not the percentages retained by the fundraiser are disclosed to
the donor, the state has an interest in keeping charitable
solicitation costs low and protecting charities from being
56
“overcharged by unscrupulous professional fundraisers.”
D. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina
At issue in the third case of the charitable solicitation trio, Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, was the state’s
57
The Act contained two
amended Charitable Solicitation Act.
provisions that a coalition of fundraisers and charitable
58
organizations challenged on First Amendment grounds. The first
provision provided for a three-tiered scale of reasonableness for
59
fundraising expenses. The Act deemed fees reasonable if they
60
were under twenty percent of the total collected. Fees between
twenty and thirty-five percent were presumed reasonable, while
those in excess of thirty-five percent were presumed
61
unreasonable.
The second provision required professional
51. Id. at 978.
52. Id. at 979-80.
53. Id. at 980.
54. Id.
55. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “[A] high fundraising fee itself betrays
the expectations of the donor who thinks that his money will be used to benefit
the charitable purpose in the name of which the money was solicited.” Id. at 980
n.2.
56. Id. at 980.
57. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
58. Id. at 785-87.
59. Id. at 784-85 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT § 131C-17.2 (1986)).
60. Id.
61. Id at 785. As in Munson, the statute contained a provision that allowed
the presumption to be rebutted if the fee could be proved necessary “either (1)
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fundraisers to affirmatively disclose the amount of funds retained
62
for themselves.
Aware of the Court’s previous holdings that charitable
solicitations are protected speech and that fee percentage-based
restrictions were not sufficiently related to fraud prevention, North
Carolina posited two distinctions for its regulatory scheme:
guaranteeing reasonable fees to maximize funds flowing to the
63
charity and the flexibility of the tiered approach. For the first
64
distinction, the Court examined two possible premises. First, the
Court considered whether charities are “economically unable to
negotiate fair or reasonable contracts without governmental
65
assistance.” The Court disposes of this possibility by citing a lack
of evidence of inequitable contracts and a failure to narrowly tailor
66
a regulation that restricts speech.
The second possible premise for the “reasonable fee”
requirement was a state interest in regulation protecting the charity
67
from an undertaking that would be harmful to its own interest.
This premise did not survive even a superficial First Amendment
68
analysis. Moreover, the court examined “legitimate reasons” for a
charity to reject the state’s interest in ensuring “reasonable”
69
fundraising fees. The Court acknowledged that a charity might
make trade-offs regarding the type of fundraising drive, the costs of

because the solitication involved the dissemination of information or advocacy on
public issues directed by the charity, or (2) because otherwise the charity’s ability
to raise money or communicate would be significantly diminished.” Id. at 785-86
(paraphrasing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131C-17.2(d)(1)-(2) (1986)).
62. Id. at 786. Unchallenged portions of the statute required the disclosure
of the professional fundraiser’s name, his or her employer’s name, and the
employer’s address. Id.
63. Id. at 789-90.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id.
66. Id. During oral arguments the Court indicated that each of the sixty
charities that stated a position voiced their opposition to the statute, prompting
North Carolina to label them as “misinformed regarding the pro-charity nature of
the statute.” Id. at 790 n.6 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 20-21).
67. Id. at 790 (calling the premise “paternalistic”).
68. Id. at 790-91.
[T]he government, even with the purest of motives, may not substitute its
judgment as to how best to speak for that for speakers and listeners . . . .
Consequently, even if the State had a valid interest in protecting charities
from their own naiveté or economic weakness, the Act would not be
narrowly tailored to achieve it.
Id. at 791-92.
69. Id.
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the drive, short-term benefits, educational opportunities, and any
other benefits that the charity may achieve through its
70
fundraising. The Court regarded opportunities for advocacy and
education to be sufficient to justify a sacrifice in the amount of
71
funds raised.
North Carolina cited the flexibility of its tiered approach to
“reasonableness” as a key distinction between this Act and previous
72
regulatory frameworks struck down by the Supreme Court.
However, having found the “generalized interest in unilaterally
imposing its notions of fairness on the fundraising contract [to be]
both constitutionally invalid and insufficiently related to a
percentage-based test,” the Court returned to familiar territory: was
the flexibility of the regulation sufficiently narrowly tailored to the
73
particular interest of protecting a charity from fraud?
Not
surprisingly, the Court, citing Munson, denied the presence of a
“nexus between the percentage of funds retained by the fundraiser
74
and the likelihood that the solicitation is fraudulent.” Even the
rebuttable presumption of the top tier was insufficient to convince
75
the Court that this Act would not have a chilling effect on speech.
The Court was unwilling to allow the possibility that a factfinder
might decide that costs or fees were excessive despite any advocacy
76
or educational content of the speech.
The second statutory feature that the Court examined was the
requirement of an affirmative disclosure of the percentage of
77
charitable contributions retained by the professional fundraiser.
Acknowledging that the commercial and educational aspects of
charitable solicitation are intertwined, and relying on its previous
70. Id. at 792.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 793.
75. Id. “Whether one views this as a restriction on the charities’ ability to
speak, or a restriction of the professional fundraisers’ ability to speak, the
restriction is undoubtedly one on speech, and cannot be countenanced here.” Id.
at 794 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 793.
77. Id. at 795. Intervening court decisions pointed to a split on the issue of
affirmative disclosures. Heritage Publ’g Co. v. Fishman, 634 F. Supp. 1489, 1505
(D.Minn. 1986) (upholding the disclosure portions of the charitable solicitation
statute while finding other portions unconstitutional in light of Schaumburg and
Munson); State v. Events Int’l, Inc., 528 A.2d 458, 461-62 (Me. 1987) (striking
down a disclosure provision that was linked to a seventy percent fundraising cost
threshold).
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holdings in Schaumburg and Munson, the Court refused to “parcel
out the speech, applying one test to one phase and another test to
78
another phase.” As a result, the Court applied the heightened test
for a regulation that addresses a compelling state interest through
79
narrowly tailored means.
The Court did not find North Carolina’s interest in
enlightening potential donors about the costs of a fundraising
80
campaign to be compelling. As in the previous cases, the Court
reminded the state that “the charity reaps a substantial benefit from
81
the act of solicitation itself.”
The Court also pointed to the
unchallenged portions of the statute that required affirmative
disclosure of the professional capacity of the fundraiser, and the
requirement to provide the percentage information to donors who
82
inquire. Nor did the Court find the statute sufficiently narrowly
83
tailored to avoid chilling otherwise protected speech.
Significantly, the Court suggested other methods of achieving
84
a narrowly tailored response to the state’s concerns. Most relevant
to this discussion is the Court’s urging to the state to “vigorously
enforce its antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from
obtaining money on false pretenses or by making false
85
statements.” So, on the one hand, the Court put legislative and
rulemaking bodies on notice that charitable solicitation was highly

78. Id. at 796.
79. Id. at 798. The Court recognized that there was a different interest
involved in compelled speech and compelled silence, but found the distinction
“without constitutional significance” in the realm of protected speech. Id. at 796.
80. Id. at 798.
81. Id. (citing Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,
963 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 635
(1980)).
82. Id. at 799. The Court gave a clear indication of its opinion of such
positive disclosures when it stated, “[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his
or her professional status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored requirement
would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. at 799 n.11. Other states have
similar affirmative disclosure requirements. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/17
(2003) (requiring prompt disclosure of paid professional fundraiser status); MINN.
STAT. § 309.556, subd. 2 (2003) (requiring disclosure of the name of the
professional fundraiser and their status as “professional fund-raiser” prior to any
oral contribution request).
83. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799-800 (calling the measure “prophylactic, imprecise,
and unduly burdensome”).
84. Id. at 800.
85. Id.
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86

protected speech. On the other hand, the Court spotlighted a
tool that states’ attorneys general could use to achieve the same
end: fraud prosecutions.
Not surprisingly, commentators analyzed the three opinions
87
and speculated on possible future regulatory challenges. There
was a sense that the Court had gone too far to protect aspects of
88
89
charitable solicitation to the detriment of regulators, donors,
90
Potential solutions included
and the charities themselves.
mandatory disclosure requirements, public education campaigns to
91
educate donors, and self-policing by the charitable sector. Fifteen
years after the Court’s decision in Riley, the Supreme Court again
addressed the interests of these constituencies as well as the

86. See Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.
1989) (affirming the unconstitutionality of three of four challenged provisions of
Virginia’s charitable solicitation statute); Indiana Voluntary Fireman’s Ass’n v.
Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (finding unconstitutional three of four
provisions of Indiana’s statute related to affirmative disclosures); People v. French,
762 P.2d 1369, 1375 (Colo. 1988) (“The state interest of informing citizens of the
percentage of contributions actually retained by the charitable organization does
not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.”); WRG Enters. v. Crowell, 758
S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tenn. 1988) (“The Riley case stands for the proposition that a
percentage based regulation upon the fees to be collected by professional
solicitors is an unconstitutional invasion upon the First Amendment rights of
charities and fund raisers alike. The Tennessee statute falls within the ambit of
that proscription.”).
87. Stephen H. Block, The Post-Riley Era: An Analysis of First Amendment
Protection of Charitable Fundraising, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101 (1991); John
Dziedzic, Comment, Krishna v. Lee Extricates the Inextricable: An Argument for
Regulating the Solicitation in Charitable Solicitations, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 665
(1994); Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for
Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (1991); Jon Strauss, First
Amendment Protection of Charitable Solicitation, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 669 (1992).
88. See Dziedzic, supra note 87, at 690-98 (proposing a regulatory focus on the
transactional aspect of charitable solicitation and advocating for a “Donor’s Bill of
Rights”).
89. Espinoza, supra note 87, at 607. “Unfortunately, following Schaumburg,
the Court moved too far in protecting the rights of charities and ignored the
contributors’ interest in ensuring that charitable contributions be used for
charitable purposes.” Id.
90. Id. at 620-21. Espinoza argues that the intertwining of programmatic and
solicitation speech undermines charity. Id. at 620. “The rhetoric of intertwining
camouflages the profound redefinition of charity that permeates the Schaumburg
analysis. A charity’s ability to seek support should be different from a charity’s
ability to shield itself from financial scrutiny.” Id. at 621.
91. Block, supra note 87, at 124-25 (rejecting self-policing and public
education in favor of additional disclosure requirements at the point of
solicitation).
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III. CASE HISTORY
A. Facts
VietNow is an Illinois charity that educates its members about
issues important to veterans of the Viet Nam War such as
93
homelessness and Agent Orange. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
(“Telemarketing”) and Armet, Inc. (“Armet”) (collectively,
Telemarketers) are professional fundraising corporations solely
94
owned by Richard Troia.
From 1987 until 1996, VietNow
95
contracted with Telemarketing to raise funds. VietNow received
fifteen percent of the funds raised by Telemarketing, which
96
retained the other eighty-five percent. Armet brokered additional
97
out-of-state contracts with third-party professional fundraisers.
Those contracts yielded ten to twenty percent of the funds to
98
Armet and ten percent to VietNow. During the period of the
contracts, Telemarketers raised over $7.1 million on behalf of
VietNow with approximately $1.1 million of that amount going to
99
the charity.
The Attorney General of Illinois filed the initial complaint in
100
1991, alleging common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
101
Primarily, the
statutory fraud, and deceptive trade practices.
complaint alleged misrepresentation of the use of the solicited
102
funds.
Because the charity received only fifteen cents of every
103
dollar raised, representations to donors that VietNow would
92. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
93. See http://www.vietnow.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
94. People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ill.
2001).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. “VietNow does not complain that it did not receive the amounts for
which it contracted . . . [or] expressed dissatisfaction with the fund-raising services
provided by the defendants.” Id.
100. Id.
101. Id at 291-92.
102. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 580 U.S. 600, 608-09
(2003).
103. In fact, there were additional allegations that “of the money raised by
Telemarketers, VietNow in the end spent only about 3 percent to provide
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benefit from significant portion of funds raised were false,
104
Affidavits submitted along with the
deceptive, and fraudulent.
complaint alleged a variety of affirmative representations regarding
105
the use of donated funds. Specific claims Telemarketers made to
prospective donors involved Thanksgiving food baskets, job
106
training, rehabilitation, and other services for veterans.
One
donor was allegedly told that ninety percent or more of her
donation would be used for veterans, and that because VietNow was
107
an all-volunteer organization, no labor costs would be incurred.
The trial court granted Telemarketers’ motion to dismiss the
108
At the subsequent appeals before the Illinois
fraud claims.
Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, Telemarketers
109
prevailed.
Not surprisingly, the Illinois Supreme Court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s previous holdings in Schaumburg,
110
Riley, and Munson.
While there was no specific regulatory
provision at issue here, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
attempt to bring fraud claims against Telemarketers created the
111
same sort of First Amendment issue raised by the previous cases.
The Illinois Supreme Court echoed each of the lessons
112
Telemarketing’s
learned from the charitable solicitation triad.
statements were only fraudulent in light of the eighty-five percent
113
solicitation fee.
The fraud claim, therefore, was an attempt to
regulate for-profit fundraisers using the same fee-based
114
percentages struck down earlier.
Like earlier Supreme Court
decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that high fundraising
115
The court expressed
costs could have a variety of reasons.
concern about non-monetary or educational messages contained in

charitable services to veterans.” Id. at 607 n.1.
104. Id. at 609.
105. Id. at 608. Procedurally, such affidavits attached to the complaint become
part of the complaint “for all purposes.” Id. at 609 n.3 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-606 (2003)). As a result, an Illinois court can consider such evidence
under a motion to dismiss.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 609.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 609-10.
111. Id. at 611.
112. See id. at 609-11.
113. Id. at 610.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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116

the solicitation process. Finally, the court read the Riley decision
to bar a definition of fraud that “places on solicitors the affirmative
duty to disclose to potential donors, at the point of solicitation, the
117
net proceeds to be returned to the charity.”
B. Court Holding and Analysis
By taking up this case, the Court agreed to address an issue
that had been referred to, but not explicitly dealt with, in its
118
Unlike the prophylactic measures in
previous holdings.
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley, this case involved fraud, which the
119
First Amendment does not protect. The Court was quick to point
out that fraud actions would not constitute a means to avoid the
120
The
First Amendment problems with those previous measures.
Court warned off any state regulator who might attempt to “gain
case-by-case ground [the] Court . . . declared off limits to
121
legislators.”
In other words, a coordinated campaign of fraud
actions in order to impose a fee-based percentage limitation against
those charities with high fundraising costs would not survive a
122
constitutional challenge.
The Court acknowledged two distinctions in the pleadings that
should allow the suit to proceed past the dismissal stage without
123
interfering with the First Amendment.
First, the complaint
alleges that Telemarketers affirmatively represented that a major
portion of donations would be used for specific programmatic
purposes, despite their knowledge that only fifteen percent of each
124
dollar donated was available to the charity.
The second
116. Id. at 610-11.
117. Id. at 611 (quoting People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763
N.E.2d 289, 298 (Ill. 2001)). But see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487
U.S. 781, 799 n.11, 800 (1988) (approving of requirements to have fundraisers
affirmatively disclose their professional status and the use of state antifraud laws to
prohibit fundraisers from “making false statements”).
118. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. at 611-12.
119. Id. at 612.
120. Id. at 617. “Simply labeling an action one for ‘fraud,’ of course, will not
carry the day.” Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. Even at the eighty-five percent retention level, the Court is
unwilling to accept percentage-based enforcement measures. Id. at n.8.
123. Id. at 617-18. When considering the legal sufficiency of a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, an Illinois court will assume the facts are true as pleaded and
interpret them “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 618 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ill. 1997)).
124. Id. at 618.
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justification the Court gave for allowing the fraud suit to proceed
was that the charitable solicitation could be seen as a façade for the
125
private inurement of Telemarketers.
The complaint describes
the funds raised for the charity as being “merely incidental to the
126
The Court was persuaded that the fraud
fund raising effort.”
action was properly tailored to the facts as pleaded, and reversed
127
and remanded the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TELEMARKETING ASSOCIATES DECISION
A. A Proper Balance
In Telemarketing Associates, the Supreme Court reached an
appropriate balance between all of the competing interests. By
emphasizing the requirements of a narrowly tailored rule and a
prohibition against “broad prophylactic” measures, the Court
forced regulators to focus on the fraudulent component of the
charitable solicitation. By emphasizing the protected nature of
non-fraudulent charitable speech, the Court reaffirmed the
importance of education and advocacy. And by allowing a fraud
case to proceed against a professional fundraiser, the Court put the
entire for-profit fundraising industry on notice that any fraudulent
portion of their charitable solicitations would not be protected.
The Court never strayed from its endorsement of fraud as a
128
means to regulate charitable solicitation.
Indeed, the Court has
appeared quite sympathetic to the oft-stated purpose behind many
of these statutes and ordinances: protecting citizens from
129
fraudulent charitable solicitations.
In Telemarketing Associates,

125. Id. at 618-19.
126. Id. at 619 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
127. Id. at 624.
128. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (“Nothing we have
said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons
may, with impunity, commit frauds on the public.”); Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (“Frauds may be denounced as offenses and
punished by law.”).
129. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306 (“Without doubt a state may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.”);
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164 (“Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the
name of charity and religion . . . [is insufficient to] empower a municipality to
abridge freedom of speech and press.”).
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however, the Court went further by giving insight into its reasons
for preferring a “properly tailored fraud action” to “broad
130
prophylactic rules.”
Fraud actions are attractive to the Court in this context
because by their very nature they are narrowly tailored to
131
“particular representations made with intent to mislead.”
The
Court considers the burden of proof of all of the elements of a
132
fraud action to be sufficient protection for charitable speech.
Despite fear by the Illinois Supreme Court that the cause of action
in this case was an attempt to circumvent previous holdings of the
Supreme Court, Telemarketing Associates stands for the proposition
that the First Amendment does not offer protection when
133
protected speech is intertwined with fraudulent speech.
Even though states may find the factual burden difficult to
establish, now fraud actions against charities or professional
fundraisers can proceed without having to address the thorny
134
Constitutional issues. By succinctly settling the First Amendment
issues of fraud and charitable solicitation, the Telemarketing
Associates Court put regulators on firmer ground when taking
action against unscrupulous fundraising practices. As a result,
states can expect a number of cases to settle before trial is even
necessary. In fact, Telemarketing Associates and its owner Richard
135
Troia settled the Illinois action involved in Telemarketing Associates.
The settlement bars Telemarketing Associates from soliciting funds
from Illinois residents and from soliciting funds on behalf of
136
Illinois charities.
130. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. at 617 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 621.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. One commentator has suggested that states could implement a system for
recording and auditing telephone solicitations by professional fundraisers. Kent
D. Wittrock, Note, The End of Fraudulent Solicitation–Really?: The Supreme Court in
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates Provides That Fraudulent Statements in
Charitable Solicitation are not Protected Speech, 72 UMKC L. REV. 275, 294 (2003).
While such a scheme would indeed provide the necessary factual basis for fraud
suits, the additional costs to the states would probably make such a system
unfeasible. Furthermore, having just escaped the specter of prior restraints, states
may be hesitant to conduct random telephone audits that could give rise to
litigation in the areas of privacy and wiretapping.
135. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Telemarketing Associates
Settlement Protects Illinois Consumers, Ends More than a Decade of Litigation
(June 15, 2004) (on file with author).
136. Id.
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The most important question that remains after Telemarketing
Associates is when a specific statement about the use of funds
constitutes misrepresentation. The Court calls the actions of
Telemarketing “a façade” and the amounts given to VietNow as
137
“incidental to the fundraising effort.” The specific threshold that
this represents is unclear. The Court does not specify whether any
affirmative statement regarding the use of the funds received will
be sufficient to meet this requirement. Having opened the door to
fraud actions, the Court may have to specify what level of
fraudulent speech is necessary to constitute a misrepresentation.
B. Fraud Enforcement Actions
While the statutory measures may yet remain the domain of
Sisyphus, discrete fraud actions against professional fundraisers and
charities will become a more popular route for regulating these
enterprises.
Coordinated fraud investigations along with a
changing regulatory environment indicate that Telemarketing
Associates was decided at the best time to provide guidance to
regulators seeking to use fraud and related actions against
professional fundraisers.
In the years between Riley and Telemarketing Associates, the
Federal Trade Commission has become an important agency in the
regulation of charitable solicitation and fraud. Beginning with
138
139
discrete prosecutions and small coordinated campaigns, the
FTC emerged as a federal partner for state regulators in the area of
charitable solicitation fraud, particularly involving telephone
solicitations. As if to reinforce fraud as the next battleground for
regulators, the FTC announced Operation Phoney Philanthropy a

137. Telemarketing Associates, 580 U.S. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Northern Virginia
Telemarketers of Desert Storm Bracelets Agree to Pay $120,000 to Settle FTC
Charges (July 13, 1992) (prohibiting the defendants from future
misrepresentations of the nature of the charitable organization, the portion used
for charity, and the public benefit derived from money raised).
139. In Operation False Alarm, the FTC and state charities regulators targeted
for-profit fundraisers who misrepresented their ties to public safety organizations
like police and fire departments. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC,
50 States Announce “Operation False Alarm” (April 9, 1997). “Operation Missed
Giving” targeted fraudulent charitable appeals more broadly with a particular
education focus on telephone solicitation and education. See Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, “Operation Missed Giving” Targets Fraudulent
Charitable Fundraising (Nov. 12, 1998).
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mere fifteen days after the Telemarketing Associates decision.
This
FTC program showcases new and existing law enforcement actions
against charities, for-profit fundraisers, and associated
141
individuals. Such actions were by no means new to the FTC, but
the scale and scope of this operation points to the ascendancy of
fraud as a means of regulating charitable solicitation. The
involvement of the FTC is crucial for targeting those fraudulent
charitable solicitation operations that operate in multiple states or
phone from one state into another. As a coordinating and
information sharing resource, the role of the FTC bodes well for
those regulators combating fraudulent solicitations.
The involvement of the FTC, however, will come at an
unexpected cost in the form of additional litigation about the First
Amendment nature of charitable solicitation. What may be
considered settled law at this point could be reopened due to
142
pending litigation involving the Federal Do-Not-Call List (DNC).
Charitable solicitations are exempt from the requirements of
143
DNC,
but challenges to the law have begun assailing the
distinction between charitable solicitations as protected speech and
144
less-protected commercial speech. DNC did impose some limited
requirements on for-profit fundraisers in the interest of combating
140. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC and States Unite to Fight
Fundraising Fraud (May 20, 2003). See also Press Release, Connecticut Attorney
General’s Office, Connecticut Participates in “Operation Phony [sic]
Philanthropy” to Target Fundraising and Charity Fraud (May 20, 2003) (specifying
lawsuits against Connecticut Vietnam Veterans, Inc. and Vietnam Veterans of
America, Inc. State Council, among others).
141. See FTC v. Bell, No. 03-790DOC (C.D. Cal. filed May 20, 2003); FTC v. W.
Coast Adver. & Mktg., Inc., No. 03-CV-0980 IEG (S.D. Cal. filed May 14, 2003);
FTC v. DPS Activity Publ’g, Ltd., No. C-03-1078 (W.D. Wash. filed May 12, 2003);
FTC v. Greenwell, No. H-03-1553 (S.D. Tex. filed May 8, 2003); FTC v. Cmty.
Affairs, Inc., No. 03-60852 (S.D. Fla. filed May 7, 2003); FTC v. Benson, No. 3:03CV-0951 (N.D. Tex. filed May 6, 2003); FTC v. Greeting Cards of Am., Inc., No. 0360746 (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 21, 2003); FTC v. Dr. Clark Research Ass’n, No. 03-CV54 (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 8, 2003); FTC v. Grant Search, Inc., No. 2:02-04174-NKL
(W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 15, 2002); FTC v. Comstar Communications, Inc., No. CIV-S02-0348 (E.D. Cal. filed February 13, 2002). The majority cause of action in these
suits are claims under § 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive
trade practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2004).
142. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C § 6101 (2004)).
143. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2003).
144. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo.
2003), rev’d by Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.
2004). The district court considered the exemption for charitable solicitations to
be an unconstitutional content-based distinction. Id. at 1168.
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145

fraudulent charitable solicitations.
These have also become the
146
Such litigation could force the Supreme
subject of litigation.
Court to more closely examine the commercial nature of charitable
solicitations and the nature of the intertwining of education,
advocacy, and commercial transactions.
C.

Regulatory Changes Since Riley

Rather than prohibit charitable solicitation altogether, the
Supreme Court expressed a preference for disclosure requirements
147
In the
that “help make contribution decisions more informed.”
years since Schaumburg and Riley, public disclosure of a charity’s
148
financial records has become commonplace.
More importantly,
public awareness of these disclosures through the Internet or the
media has resulted in increased scrutiny from and accountability to
the giving public.
1.

IRS Disclosures

Requirements that a charity or its professional fundraiser
disclose financial information remains a popular means for
ensuring accountability of charities and preventing fraudulent
solicitations. Adding to the existing disclosure requirements of
149
charitable organizations,
the 104th Congress expanded the
disclosure requirements for all organizations exempt from taxation
150
under I.R.C. § 501(c). After the amended law and its subsequent
rulemaking, the application filed requesting tax-exempt status
along with the organization’s annual information returns were
151
open to public inspection.
Such information returns contain
important information regarding the finances and fundraising
152
activities of the organization.
501(c)(3) organizations are
required to provide copies of these returns for three years after the
145. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2003).
146. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2004).
147. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638
(1980).
148. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
149. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 4, 22.
150. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, § 1313, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2004)).
151. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d) (2004). Organizations are required to file an annual
information return, the IRS Form 990, that specifies income, expenses, salaries,
and program activities. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(b) (2004).
152. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(b) (2004).
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153

filing date of the return.
Individual requests can be fulfilled
collectively if the returns are widely available, specifically over the
154
Internet.
These disclosure requirements are significant educational and
accountability measures. They aid the regulatory battle against
charitable solicitation fraud by disseminating information about
organizations and educating and empowering donors to explore
the programmatic and financial reporting of an organization that
requests their donation.
2.

Intermediate Sanctions

The second key regulatory change affecting charitable
organizations does not directly address fraud, disclosure, and
accountability.
Instead, recent legislation seeks to “prevent
wrongdoing by persons who have a special relationship” with
155
charities.
Along with additional public disclosure requirements,
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 imposed taxes on a class of individuals
who engaged in a transaction with the charity that unreasonably
156
benefited the individual.
These taxes are labeled intermediate
sanctions, and target excess benefit transactions between the
157
charity and disqualified persons.
Revenue-sharing transactions such as those between charities
and professional fundraisers resulting in a percentage division of
158
funds raised may become part of intermediate sanctions law.
153. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d) (2004).
154. IRS Procedure and Administration Rule, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6104(d)-2
(2004). While it does not satisfy the “widely available” requirement due to a
technical matter, Guidestar, in partnership with the IRS and the National Center
for Charitable Statistics, maintains a database of approximately one million
charities’ information returns. See http://www.guidestar.org. The Supreme Court
examined a copy of VietNow’s IRS Form 990 as part of its decision. Illinois ex rel.
Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc. 538 U.S. 600, 607 n.1 (2003).
155. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 2 (2003).
156. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, § 1311, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2004)).
157. “The sanctions are considered intermediate because they are between the
choices of revocation of tax-exempt status and inaction on the part of the IRS.”
HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 3. An excess benefit transaction is one in which the
economic benefit to the disqualified person exceeds the value of consideration
received for providing the benefit. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2004). A disqualified
person is one “in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.” Id. § 4958(f)(1). The full scope of this complex regulation is
beyond this note. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 155.
158. See HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 149-50, 157-58 (describing the history of
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While the IRS does not consider fundraising percentage fee
159
arrangements to be excess benefit transactions per se, future
proposed rulemaking could target such transactions. By focusing
on the private benefit to the fundraiser, rather than the language
used to perform the fundraising, the IRS may be able to succeed
where state regulators have failed. Rather than assume that a
contract with a professional fundraiser with high fees is
presumptively fraudulent, such a transaction could be
presumptively one of excess benefit. The resulting regulation
could have the same effect to regulate fundraising fees, but without
involving prior restraints on the protected speech of the charities.
V. CONCLUSION
After Riley it may have been unclear what options remained
available to regulators who sought to protect the public from
fraudulent charitable solicitation. Over the years between Riley and
Telemarketing Associates, fraud actions and mandatory disclosures
have worked together to provide the best means for regulating this
area. Neither fraud actions nor most mandatory disclosures run
afoul of the First Amendment in the same manner as broad
prohibitions or strict licensing. The world has changed since Riley.
The widespread availability of information about charities has
created a more informed donor, while abuses continue to attract
the media and legislators. Charities and professional fundraisers
face continued scrutiny over their fundraising and solicitation
practices, but this is done in the hopes of maintaining a charitable
sector that continues to attract donations by being open, effective,
and accountable.

revenue-sharing rulemaking and its application in the fundraising context).
159. HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 149-50.
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